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GERRIT SMITH'S 



CONSTITUTIONAL AROIIMMT. 



[0= SECOND EDITION, ENLARGED. .=0] 



SUBSTANCE OF TIIE SPEECH 



MADE BY 



GERRIT SMITH, 



IN THE CAPITOL 



OF THE 



STATE OF NEW YORK, 



March lltli and 12th, 1850. 



5^°SEC0ND EDITION— ENLARGED..^^ 



SYRACUSE : 

V. W. SMITH & CO., I'RINTEUS. 
1850. 






Trus edition of the Abstract of Mr Smith's speech, is somewhat more 
copious than the other ; and it contains a few additional illustrations. It is 
still, however, but little more than a collection of hints for an Argument on 
tlie unconstitutionality of Slavery. Whoever would read an Argument on 
this subject — an Argument strictly legal and triumphantly logical — should 
read Spooner. 

It is to be regretted, that so little has been preserved of the many ingeni- 
ous and able arguments made, a dozen or fifteen years ago, in our anti-slavery 
meetings, to prove the unconstitutionality of Slavery. Who, that had the 
privilege of listening to that man of genius, Alvan Stewart, on this subject, 
can ever forget with what originality and power he wielded Magna Charta, 
Mansfield's Decision in the Somerset case, the Declaration of Independence, 
tlie Writ of Habeas Corpus, and various provisions of the Constitution, 
against the doctrine of the constitutionality of American Slavery ? 



By Traaerfbr 

NOV 1 3 1922 



ARGUMENT. 



Mr. Smith began with saying, that the following Petitions, 
numerously signed, had been presented to the Legislature, the 
present Session : 

To the Senate and Assemlily of the State of Neto York: 

What a wonder, what a shame, wliat a crime, that, in the midst of tlie 
light and progress of the middle of the nineteenth century, such an abomi- 
nation and outrage, as slavery, should beacknoivledgcd to be a legal insti- 
tution ! \Vlio, that reverences Law, and would have it bless the world, can 
consent, that its sanction and support, its honor and holiness, be given to 
such a compound of robbery, and meanness, and murder, as is slavery ? 

Your petitioners pray, that your Honorable Bodies request the Repre- 
sentatives and instruct the Senators of this State in Congress to treat the 
legalization of slavery as an impossibility ; and, moreover, to insist, that 
the Federal Constitution shall, like all other laws, be subjected to the strict 
rules of legal interpretation, to the end, that its anti-slavery character be. 
tliereby, seen and established, ixnd all imputations upon that character for- 
ever excluded. 

The slaveholder will be strong, so long as he can plead law for bus 
rnatohless crime. But take from him that plea, and he will be too weak to 
continue his grasp upon his victims. It is unreasonable to look for the 
peaceful termination of slavery, whilst the North, and especially whilst 
abolitionists of the North, sustain tiie claim of the South to its Constitu- 
tionality. But, let the North, and especially abolitionists of the North, 
resist, and expose the absurdity of, this claim — and slavery, denied tliere- 
after all countenance and nourishment from the Constitution, will quickly 
perish. 

Your petitioners will esteem it a great favor, if your Honorable Bodien 
will consent to hear one or more of them in behalf of the prayers of their 
Petition. 

January 22, 1850. 



To the Senate and Assembly of the State of Xew York : 

The undersigned Petitioners, request your Honorable Bodies to give 
Gerrit Smith a public hearing on the question, whether Slavery has any 
legal existence under tlie Federal Constitution I 

February 14, 1850. 

Mr. Smith said, that it was in consequence of these Peti- 
tions, that he had the privilege of speaking on this occasion. 
lie confessed, that he felt embarrassed by the latter Petition. 
Its designation of himself had, as he apprehended, excited 



far higher'expectations of his powers of advocacy than he 
should be able to satisfy. 

Mr. Smith proceeded to say, that God made man in His 
own image — " a little lower than the angels"-— and " crowned 
him with glory and honor." But slavery seizes upon this ex- 
alted being, and hurls him down from the high place, where 
his Maker put him, to a place among " four footed beasts and 
creeping things." The language of the slave-code is : — " The 
slave shall be taken, reputed, held, sold, as a chattel, to all 
intents and purposes and constructions whatever." Such is 
the fraud, such is the pirac}', on human rights, of which sla- 
very is guilty. It strips its victim of every right. It subjects 
him to every wrong. It reduces him to a brute. It classes 
him with brutes. Southern advertisements run — " To be 
sold on such a day, and at such a place, so many horses, so 
man}'' men, so many women, so many children, so many 
cows, so many wagons and carts." It was a strange freak 
of fancy and folly in the Roman ruler, who elevated his fa- 
vorite horse to the dignity of the consulship, and exacted for 
that horse the homage of his degenerate countrymen. But 
what more strange is it to turn a horse into a man, as did 
the Roman ruler, than to turn a man into a horse, as does 
the slaveholder ! 

Horrible and abominable, however, as is slavery, it is, 
nevertheless, claimed, that the Federal Constitution legalizes 
it, or, at least, admits its legality, and protects its existence. 
Our reply to this claim is, that slavery is incapable of legali- 
zation ; and that no paper, however authoritative, can legal- 
ize it, or sanction its legality, or protect its existence. Law 
is for the protection of rights — not for the destruction of rights. 
But murder itself is not more decisively and sweepingly de- 
structive of rights than is slavery. Nay, it is not so much 
so ; — for murder is only one of the elements in the infernal 
compound of slavery. Law is sim])ly the rule, or require- 
ment of natural justice. To attempt, then, to identify it with 
naked, avowed and the very extrem.est injustice — what can 
be more absurd ? This attempt, so well nigh universal, to 
confound law with the opposite of law ; justice with injus- 
tice; right with wrong ; is, of itself, sufficient to explain the 



prevailing want of reverence for true law, and the readiness 
with which men cast off its just requirements. Never, until 
it be universally admitted, that Law commands only what is 
right, and prohibits only what is wrong, will Law be univer- 
sally respected and obeyed. 

No man has seen more clearly, or expressed more glow- 
ingly and effectively, than Henry Brougham, the impossibili- 
ty of legalizing slavery. '" Tell me not of rights," says that 
mighty man. "Talk not of the property of the planter in 
his slaves. I deny the right. I acknowledge not the proper- 
ty. The principles, the feelings of our common nature, rise 
in rebellion against it. Be the appeal m.ade to the under- 
standing, or to the heart, the sentence is the same, that rejects 
it. In vain, you tell me of laws, that sanction such a claim. 
There is a law above all the enactments of human codes. It 
is the law written by the finger of God upon the heart of 
man ; and by that law, unchangeable and eternal, while men 
despise fraud, and loathe rapine, and abhor blood, they shall 
reject with indignation the wild and guilty fantasy, that man 
can hold property in man." 

We wonder at the laws of our ancestors for putting witches 
to death. We pity their superstition and delusion. But our 
posterity will wonder much more at our laws for reducing 
men to slavery : — and they will execrate the avarice and 
wickedness, which prompted us to enact and execute such 
laws. 

It is no new doctrine, that law cannot stretch its covering 
over every abomination. Even Blackstone, notwithstanding 
he lacks the courage to contemn the English tradition and 
the English maxim, that Parliament is omnipotent, repeated- 
ly admits, that human law is, so far as it contravenes Divine 
law, utterly void. And if we go back as far as Lord Coke, 
we find him citing numerous cases, in which it was held, that 
the common law, or, in other words, common sense, or com- 
mon justice, was sufficient to nullify an xVct of Parliament, 
lie says, (see reference to Dr. Bonham's case in Life of Lord 
Bacon:) "It appeareth in our books, that in many cases the 
common law shall control acts of Parliament, and sometimes 
shall adjudge them to be utterly void : for when an Act of 



Parliament is against common right and reason, or repug- 
nant, or impossible to be performed, the common law shall 
control this, and adjudge such act to be void." 

It is a very great, though very common, mistake, that hu- 
man law is commensurate with the whole field of human re- 
lations, interests, and obligations. It can occupy but a small 
portion of that field. INIany take the ground, that human 
law can legalize anv thing— that the Constitution can Consti- 
tutionalize any thing. Not only, however, are crimes inca- 
pable of being legalized, but there are extensive and whole 
classes of human concerns and duties, which are ever to be 
held sacred from the control and invasion of human enact- 
ments. Sumptuary laws, because concerning themselves 
with what does not come within the legitimate scope of hu- 
man legislation, are to be treated as of no obligation. And 
what but a sheer impertinence would be the statute, which 
should presume to prescribe and enjoin the endearments and 
intercourse between parent and child ? 

The just and high ground, that slavery is too iniquitous and 
foul and monstrous a thing to be, by any possibility, embodied 
and sheltered in the forms of law, should be taken by every 
one. But, for the sake of the argument, I come down from 
this high ground, and admit the possibility of legalizing sla- 
very. °The question, then, for me now to address myself to, 
is whether the Constitution is a law of slavery, or whether it 
forbids it. But, before entering upon the discussion ot the 
question of the Constitutionality of slavery, I wish it to be 
distinctly understood, and fully admitted, that this is not a 
historical question-but a legal question ; and, that to ascer- 
tain the meaning of the Constitution, we are to subject it, as 
we do any other law, to the strict rules of legal interpretation. 

Obeyine- these rules, we are 

1st To look after the intention of the adopters of the Constitution. The 
intention of its framers we do not need to concern ourselves w.h ar^m re 
tJian vv-ith the intention of the scrivener, whom we emplojed to ^^Tlte the 

'td.%: laThel the ition of the adopters of the ConstUution from t^^^ 
letter of the Constitution. « Language," said Tallyrand " is thea^ of con- 
ceaUng the thoughts." Such may, possiblJ^ have been the ^^s^fj ^^ ^;"^y 
of the^alks and writings of some of the adopters ^f^^^^.^^^'^'^^^k 
of the Constitution. Men, who are engaged m writing a « ^^^^e^ "V'^ ^/^ 
and write concerning it with the view of misleading people in regard to its 



meaning. It is true, that they may also frame the statute to that very end. 
But, it is a^eed on all hands, that we are compelled to tnke the statute, so 
far as it isintellitrible, as the only evidence of their meaning and intention. 

3d. Obeying these rules of interpretation, we are, where the letter of ^he 
Constitution is unintelligible, or ambiguous, to go out of the Constitution 
into the collateral e\idences of its meaning. This, however, only for the 
purpose of establishing an innocent meaning — a meaning in consonance 
with justice. There is no such liberty of range for the purpose of fasten- 
ing upon the Constitution a construction at war witli justice. From such a 
construction the Constitution must be spared, unless its letter absolutely 
and inentiibly demands it. In tlus declaration I am fully sustained by the 
rule laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in the case 
against Fisher and others (2 Cranch 390.) " ^\^^ere rights are infringed, 
where fundamental principles are OTerthrown, where the general system of 
the laws is departed from, tlie legislative intention must be expressed with 
irresistible clearness, to induce a court of justice to suppose a design to ef- 
fect such objects." To illustrate this rule, and apply it to the present case. 
If it is claimed, under the Constitution, that one man may rob another of 
his horse, the right to do so must be expressed in the Constitution, and ex- 
pressed too with irresisiible clearness. So, too, and much more emphatical- 
ly, if it is claimed, under the Constitution, that one man may rob anotlierof 
bis liberty — of hunself — of his all — the right must be not inferred — not im- 
plied — but couched in express and irresistibly clear terms. 

Senator Verplanck says, (20th Wendell 322,) 

" It affords a safe rule of construction for Courts in the interpretation of 
laws, admitting of any doubtful construction, to presume, that the Legisla- 
ture could not liave intended an uneqiial and unjust operation of its stat- 
utes. Such a construction ought never to be given to legislative language, 
if it be susceptible of any otlier more conformable to justice." 

4th. Another of these rules requires, that if injustice and slavery, as well 
as justice and liberty, are in the Constitution, and that if either must be 
thro\\ii out for inconsistency, it must be injustice and slavery. We must 
treat our Shylock of slavery, as the laws of Venice treated her Shylock. If 
our Sliylock of slavery must have his pound of flesh, why then he must have 
it. But he shall take nothing more — no, not even one drop of blood. And 
not even his pound of flesh shall he be allowed to take, if, to take that, he 
must needs take aught — even one drop of blood — besides. Or, to drop the 
figure : — if there are provisions for slavery in the Constitution, and they 
cannot operate but at the expense of subverting provisions in it for liberty, 
tlien such provisions for slavery must not be allowed to operate. 

I will not, at this stage of my remarks, mention any other 
of the rules, by which the Constitution is to be interpreted. 
In the progress of the discussion, I may have occasion to 
mention others. 

All admit, that if there was no legal slavery in this coun- 
try, at the time the Constitution was adopted, the Constitu- 
tion did not legalize any. All admit, that the Constitution 
did, at the most, but repeat the legalization of slavery ; or, 



8 

rather, did but approvingly recognize already existing sla- 
very. 

Was there any legal slavery in this country, at the time the 
Constitution was adopted? The Colonial Charters, surely, 
did not authorize it ; for these charters all forbade, that the 
laws of the Colonies should be repugnant to the laws of 
England ; and what the laws of England M^ere, in respect to 
slavery, is manifest from the celebrated decision of the King's 
Bench in 1772. That was the decision, that, in England, 
there is no right of propertj^ in man. That was the decision 
wrung from Lord Mansfield. The like decision — the deci- 
sion, that there cannot be in America anj^ right of property 
in man — will, at no distant day, be wrung from the Courts of 
America. It was the indomitable perseverance of an hum- 
ble lajanan, Granville Sharp, which compelled Lord Mans- 
field to withstand the tide of slavery in England. Would 
that there were such a layman to compel the Courts of 
America to withstand the tide of slavery in America ! I do 
not flatter myself, that the Courts, in any part of the world, 
will proceed, self-moved, to a very self-denying duty. The 
powers that be, whether in Church or State, are quite too 
conservative — quite too deeply interested in continuing the 
present condition of things — to volunteer in comprehensive 
and ra,dical reforms. 

Shameful were the expedients, which Lord Mansfield re- 
sorted to to stave off the decision in this case. Shrinking 
from the responsibility of pronouncing judgment, he would, 
from time to time, postpone the duty. He was even so cow- 
ardly, as repeatedly to suggest, that the matter might be ended 
by the claimant's manumitting his slave. Mansfield was not 
the only great man, who, in that crisis, allowed himself to be 
swayed and overawed by a corrupt and wicked public senti- 
ment. BJackstone was as guilt}^ as he, in this respect. He 
had, previously, published the first Edition of his Commen- 
taries. In that Edition he held the following truthful lan- 
guage : 

"And this siiirit of libert_y is so deeply implanted in our Constitution, and 
rooted even in our very soil, that a slave or a negro, the moment he lands in 
England, falls under the protection of the laws, and Avith regard to all na- 
tjonal rights, becomes eo instanli a freeman." 



9 

But, in the course of the trial, which so shook tlic nerves 
of poor Mansfield, the 2d Edition of Blackstonc's Commen- 
taries was published. In that Edition he changed the words : 
" and with regard to all national rights, becomes co instanti 
a freeman," into the words : "' and so far becomes a free- 
man — though the master's right to his service may possibly 
remain." Such was Blackstone's subservience to the pro- 
slavery sentiment, which then reigned in England. What 
wonder, if such men, as Mansfield and Blackstone, could 
consent to be the servants of the slave-power, that the great 
men of America also should consent to a similar self-degra- 
dation ! Human nature is the same in America, as in Eng- 
land. But, thanks to our Maker, slavery can no more live 
always in America than it could in England. What is law — 
true and righteous law — in respect to slaver}^ will yet be de- 
clared by the Courts of America: and the declaration will 
be as fatal to slavery in America, as was the like declaration 
to slavery in England. 

Lord Mansfield's decision was, of course, as applicable to 
the Colonies, as to England herself. If there could be no 
legal slavery in England, then there could be no legal slave- 
ry in the Colonies. Alas, that there was not a disposition in 
the Colonies to apply iMansfield's decision to the abolition of 
Colonial slavery ! Had there been, the present generation in 
America, and that, Avhich preceded it, would have been saved 
from the curse of slavery. But, it is said, that laws had been 
enacted in the Colonies, by the terms of which persons could 
beheld in slavery. I deny, that a fair and legal interpreta- 
tion of these terms warrants this conclusion, or any approach 
to this conclusion. Read these laws — and you will find, that 
the)'' assumed (as, indeed, is the case with all slave-laws.) 
that slavery had already an existence — a, rightful, not to say 
legal, existence. ^Moreover, 3'ou will find, that their descrip- 
tion of its victims was quite too indefinite and vague to iden- 
tify them ; and that, hence these laws were void for uncer- 
tainty. What, hov.^ever, if there were not these objections 
to these laws ? The laws were, nevertheless, unconstitu- 
tional and void, because at war with the Charters, which 
were the Constitutions of the Colonies. But, it is said, that 



10 

slavery was tolerated in the Colonies after Mansfield's deci- 
sion. So it was in England also. But toleration, neither in 
the Colonies, nor in England, should be taken for, or con- 
founded with, legalization. I will read a part of an adver- 
tisement to show, that it was tolerated in England after 
Mansfield's decision. It is dated, "Liverpool, Oct. 15th, 

1779." 

" To be sold by auction at George Dunbar's office, on Thursday next, the 
aist inst., at 1 o'clock, a black boy, about fourteen years of age, &c." 

To show that it was tolerated in England before Mans- 
field's decision, I will read another advertisement. 

" Public Advertiser, Tuesday, 22d Nov., 1769. 
To be sold a black girl, the property of J. B., eleven years of age, 
who is extremely handy, works at her needle tolerably, and speaks Eng- 
lish perfectly well — is of an excellent temper and willing disposition.^ En- 
quire of Mr. Owen at the Angel Inn, behind St. Clements Church in the 
Strand." 

These relics of England's pro-slavery literature very strik- 
ingly remind us of the like species of literature abounding in 
our Southern newspapers. 

I pass on to the Declaration of Independence : — and I 
ask — what if there had been, down to the putting forth of 
that paper, legal and constitutional slavery in this land, did 
not that paper put an end to such slavery? That paper, 
more than any other paper, which ever was, or ever shall be, 
uttered the heart of the American people. That paper will, 
so long as this nation shall endure — and God grant that it 
may endure unbroken and undivided to the end of time ! 
(Mr. Smith was here interrupted by repeated applause.) I 
confess most unaffectedly, said Mr. Smith, that I welcome 
your applause of the prayer, which fell from my lips. But, 
I would have my hearers remember, that if the union of 
these States shall endure, it must be cemented by justice — by 
justice to the red man and the black man, as well as to the 
white man — by justice to all men. Expedients, from which 
justice and truth and mercy and God are shut out, are not 
the expedients for maintaining the union of these States. 
All such expedients will prove abortive. I have seen the re- 
cent propositions of some of our eminent statesmen for pre- 
serving the American Union. They are, perhaps, charac- 
terized by wisdom. But it is the wisdom of this world — not 



11 

" the wisdom which cometh from above." They are, indeed, 
propositions for peace. But " the wisdom, which cometh from 
above, is Jirst pure — then peaceable." Now, there is no pu- 
rity, no integrity, no religion, in these propositions. More- 
over, the peace, which they propose, is an evanescent, because 
a spurious, peace. The peace that is permanent, is the 
peace that follows purity — is the peace which is the offspring 
of purity. These propositions are full of murderous wrong 
to millions. Had they involved known and deliberate wrong 
to but one person — and that one person the least black baby 
in all the South — even then God could not have been in the 
propositions, and His blessing could not have been upon them. 
The peace that could come from such propositions, must, at 
best, be but the peace of the wicked : — and, as God is true, 
" there is no peace to the wicked." 

To return, said Mr. Smith, to what I had begun to say, 
when your patriotism and partiality interrupted me — the 
Declaration of Independence will, so long as this Nation en- 
dures, be, for some purposes, the highest Constitutional 
authority in the Nation. This paper settled it, forever, in the 
minds and hearts of our countrymen, that self-government is 
the right of every people. In every part of our land, men 
of all parties in religion and politics fall back upon the De- 
claration of Independence, as the highest Constitutional au- 
thority, that every people have the right of self-government. 
In respect to this transcendently important right, this paper 
lies at the basis of both the Federal and State Constitutions. 
It is the very soul of these Constitutions — the Constitution of 
Constitutions. The instance is not wanting, in which the 
whole of it has been embodied in a State Constitution. It 
was no extravagance in Gen. Root to contend, (see Ham- 
mond's History of New York, vol. 1, p. 540,) " that the Decla- 
ration of Independence is the fundamental law of the land, 
in all those States, which claimed or admitted, that that in- 
strument was framed by their agents." Whence, indeed, did 
the Congress of the Confederation, and did the Convention, 
which framed the Federal Constitution, derive their legiti- 
macy and authority ? Whence but from this Paper, which 
was the first sovereign act of the American people — their 



12 

authoritative utterance at the moment of their Nation's 
birth ? Was it then for that Congress, or that Convention, to 
repudiate the very life-principles of that paper, to which they 
owed their own life ? 

The following Resolution, adopted by the men, who sent 
forth the Declaration of Independence, shows, that, in their 
esteem, it was to be regarded, as, among all human laws, su- 
preme : 

'• Resolved, That copies of the Declaration be sent to the several assem- 
blies, conventions, and committees, or council;? of safety, and to the several 
commanding otiicers of the Continental troops; that it be proclaimed in each 
of the United States, and at the head of the army." 

I said, that the Declaration of Independence is our highest 
human authority for the right of every people to self-govern- 
ment. But what does the Declaration itself set forth as the 
ground of this right ? It sets forth as that ground, that all 
men are created equal, and that life, liberty, and the pursuit 
of happiness are inalienable rights. And can we, then, go 
to this paper for authority for this right, and yet reject the 
verv ground and reason for it, which the paper itself sets 
forth ? Certainly not. If the Declaration of Independence 
is our authority for the self-government of a people, equally 
is it our authority for maintaining, that freedom is the birth- 
right of all 

Suppose, that, during the American Revolution, an Ameri- 
can had been arraigned, before an American Court, for trea- 
son to the Crown — could he not have successfully plead the 
Declaration of Independence to prove his right to break his 
allegiance to the Crown ? None doubt it. What, however, 
if he had been arrested, the next day, as a fugitive slave? 
Ought not his plea, that the same paper recognizes liberty to 
be the birth-right of all, to be just as successful, as was his 
plea, the day previous 1 Certainl5^ For the same paper, 
which he quoted, the day before, makes the right of a people 
to self-government grow out of the inalienable right of the 
individual to liberty. I hold, then, that, if there ever were 
legal slavery in this countr}', it ceased forever, when the 
American people did, with well nigh one consent, adopt that 
immortal paper, v/hich declares all men to be created equal, 
and to have an inalienable right to life, liberty and the pur- 



13 

suit of happiness. Well may the Declaration be, as it has 
ever been, inexpressibly dear to every true American heart. 
That slaveholders — that they, who buy and sell men as 
hogs — should call it " a fanfaronade of nonsense," is not 
strange. 

Ere proceeding to examine the Federal Constitution, I ad- 
mit (for such admission is required by the rules of interpre- 
tation, which I have laid down) that, provided the letter of 
that instrument is clearly and certainly anti-slavery, or clear- 
ly and certainly pro-slavery, I am not to meddle with history. 
If, however, its letter be anti-slavery, though more or less 
doubtfully so, then I may go into history to fortify that letter, 
and to establish the anti-slavery character of the Constitu- 
tion. No.w, on the supposition (which is, however, only a 
supposition,) that the letter of the Constitution is but doubt- 
fully anti-slavery, I am at liberty to refer to pieces of histo- 
ry, which go far to show, that the Constitution is necessarily 
anti-slavery. Its framers would not allow the word " servi- 
tude" in the Constitution, because it expresses the condition 
of slaves, and they would have the word " service" in its 
stead, because it expresses the obligations of free persons. 
Mr. Madison was not objected to, w^hen he said, that he 
"thought it wrong to admit in the Constitution the idea, that 
there could be property in man." I do not say what were 
their inteniiona, as to keeping slavery out of, or getting it into, 
the Constitution — for what ihpAT intentions were, is, as I have 
already said, immaterial. But I do say, that there are vari- 
ous historical proofs, that the framers of the Constitution 
sought to have it wear a fair face for justice and liberty — so 
fair, that if after ages should learn the mortifying fact, that 
there had ever been slavery in this land, they should, never- 
theless, not learn it from the pages of the Constitution. 
These historical proofs will be confirmed, if, on looking into 
the Constitution, we shall find, that its framers kept it clear 
of the words "slave" and " slavery," and of all words of lilvc 
import. 

Now, were it true, that the framers of the Constitution — 
even all of them — sought to smuggle slavery into it — to get 
it into it, without its being seen to be got into it ; neverthe- 



14 

less, the restrictions, which they imposed upon themselves in 
framing it, made it impracticable to get slavery into that in- 
strument. It was an impracticability, which they had them- 
selves laid upon the very threshold of their work. To get 
slavery into such an instrument, as its framers had, from the 
first, determined, that the Constitution should — I do not say, 
be — but should appear to be — was as impossible, as to build 
up a fire in the sea. The embodied principles of justice and 
liberty would no more permit the one than the waters Avould 
permit the other. Talk of mixing slavery with liberty ! As 
well talk of mixing oil with water. " As well," in the words of 
the immortal poet, "may there be amity and life 'tween fire and 
snow." Talk of a web, the warp of which shall be of liber- 
ty and the woof of slavery ! — such talk is nonsense. The 
Constitution is either for slavery, or for liberty. Is liberty 
provided for in it, and among its reigning principles ? What, 
then, if there are lines in it, which, by themselves, would 
make for slavery ? These lines, so far as they conflict with 
the Constitutional provisions for liberty, must be thrown out 
for inconsistency. The wrong must recede before the right — 
not the right before the wrong. 

After making, for the sake of the argument, the admission, 
that, notwithstanding the Declaration of Independence or any 
thing else, there was legal slavery in this land down to the 
time of the adoption of the Constitution, I proceed to take up 
the Constitution. 

And now, with what feelings, are we to enter upon the ex- 
amination of the Constitution ! It is claimed, that the white 
people of the North did, some sixty years ago, conspire with 
the white people of the South to hold the black people of thLs 
land, both of that and of all coming generations, in slavery : 
and it is jurther claimed, that the Federal Constitution is the 
paper, which at once proves, and imparts validity to, this dia- 
bolical bargain : and that, therefore, American citizens are 
all bound to help carry this diabolical bargain into etfect. I 
again inquire, with what feelings are we to enter upon the 
examination of the Constitution ? On the supposition, that 
there was this conspiracy, are our feelings to be on the side 
of these two parties of conspirators ? God forbid ! we can- 



15 

not be men — much less can we be christians — if we suffer 
our feelings to enlist on that side. Our sympathies must be 
with the third party in the case. Our sympathies must be 
promptly, wholly, constantly, with the poor broken-hearted, 
outraged victims of this conspiracy. We must take up the 
Constitution with the deepest desire to find it clear of all evi- 
dence of this conspiracy — or, failing to find it so, to find it 
full of power to put an end to this conspiracy. In a word, 
if there is this conspiracy, we must take up the Constitution 
to make from it all we can against the conspirators and all 
we can for those, who are conspired against. Do I ask here 
for aught, that is unreasonable — for aught, that is unlawful ? 
Certainly not. 

My first remark on the Constitution is, that all must admit, 
that the pro-slavery construction of it cannot abide the appli- 
cation of the rule of the Supreme Court of the United States, 
which I have quoted. If slavery is, at all, in the Constitution, 
aevertheless all must admit, that it is not there in express, 
much less in irresistibly clear terms. All must admit, that a 
person, however intelligent — if nevertheless a stranger to the 
history of our country — might read and re-read the Consti- 
tution, without once suspecting, that there is slavery in it. I 
will, for the sake of the argument, take the rule in question 
as unsound, and reject it. Nevertheless, I wish all to see 
how entirely fatal to every pro-slavery interpretation of the 
Constitution would be the application of this rule. 

"We learn two things from the preamble of the Constitu- 
tion. 1st. Who made the Constitution ; and 2d. What they 
made it for. " We the people of the United States" made it 
Is this phrase of uncertain meaning ? Then must the whole 
Constitution be void for uncertainty : — for then, the Constitu- 
tion does not designate, and then the Government does not 
know, its own citizens. It is said, that it is for the State 
Governments to determine who shall be the citizens of the 
Federal Government. Then, it is in the power of the States 
to deprive the Federal Government of all citizens, and, in 
short, to annihilate our national capacity ! But, in point of 
fact, there is not the least uncertainty in the meaning of the 
phrase : " We the people of the United States." It necessa- 



16 



rily means all and not a part— every kind and not one kind— 
of the people, who were, at that time, permanent inhabitants 
of the country. To say, that the phrase means but voters, is 
to say, that, not only many of the white men, as well as all 
the black men, were shut out from citizenship, but also all 
the white women and white children, as well as all the black 
women and black children. The voters, in such a case, rep- 
resent the whole permanent population. 

Nothinjr is plainer than that they, who claim, that a part 
of the people was excepted from " We the people," should 
show the exception in the Constitution. Moreover, as the 
exception would be a piece of flagrant injustice, the Supreme 
Court of the United States must (I will not say, to be right) 
must, to be consistent with itself, require the proof of it to 
be couched in express and irresistibly clear terms. I digress , 
for a moment, to ask how, in the absence of all proof of this 
exception, the State of New York can justify herself for ex- 
cluding the colored man from the ballot box 1 Her first 
Constitution was not guihy of this proscription. Under that, 
colored men had as free access, as white men, to the ballot 
box. I admit, that the right to regulate voting belongs to 
each State, and not to the Federal Government. But this 
right is to be exercised reasonably ; and, therefore, not with 
a "reference to the color of the hair, or the color of the skin. 
Did justice reign in this State, and were our .Tudiciary deliv- 
eredfrom the spirit of caste, that part of our State Constitu- 
tion which shuts out men from the ballot-box, because of the 
color of their skin, would be declared void for its repugnancy 
to the tenor, spirit and requirements of the Federal Constitu- 
tion. To return from this digression— no argument— nothing 
worthy of the name of argument— can be offered against my 
definition of " We the people." This definition, being unan- 
swerably true, it follows, that, if there were slaves in this 
country, at the time the Constitution was adopted, that in- 
strument made them all citizens, and, therefore, made them 
all free. The first line then of the Constitution—! he first line 
even of its preamble— is the death of slavery. Perhaps, 
however, an ingenious lawyer would take the ground, that 
the slave part of the people consented to be, and were, there- 



17 

fore, slaves still. But, this ground is untenable for the rea- 
sons — 1st. That, under a Constitution, which makes all free, 
none could be slaves, if they. would — 2d. That, as it is never 
to be supposed, unless, indeed, the language of the instru- 
ment make the supposition unavoidable, that a party to a 
contract consents to the open and flagrant wronging of itself 
in that contract, it is not to be supposed, that a party to the 
Constitution consented therein to their ow^n enslavement and 
the enslavement of their posterity. (Mr. Smith here read a 
page or two from Lysander Spooner's book on the unconsti- 
tutionality of slavery — spoke in the highest terms of that 
book— commended it 'to all his hearers — and confessed his 
great indebtedness to it on the present occasion.) 

I will say no more, said Mr. Smith, on that part of the 
Preamble, which informs us who made the Constitution. 
And on that part of it, which informs us for what they made 
it, I say, that one thing, for which it was made, was (to use 
the language of the Preamble, itself) " to secure the blessings 
of liberty :" — not to inflict, or uphold, the curse of slavery — 
but "to secure the blessings of liberty." 

Thus far, then, the Constitution is anti-slavery. And, 
since we see the Goddess of Liberty standing in its porch, 
may we not hope to find, that the whole Constitution consti- 
tutes her glorious temple. Let us walk through its apart- 
ments to see whether they correspond with the porch. Or, 
to drop the figure, let us see whether the body of the Consti- 
tution corresponds with its Preamble, 

Ere proceeding to examine the body of the Constitution, 
let me say, that the preamble of a law, though not identical 
with, and though not of equal authority with, its enacting 
clauses, is, nevertheless, a valuable guide in interpreting 
those clauses. 

We have, now, come to the examination of the.iour provi- 
sions of the Constitution, which are relied on to prove its pro- 
slavery, character. The first respects the apportionment of 
representatives. It is claimed, that the "other persons," re- 
ferred to in this provision, are slaves. But, if they are, then 
does not this provision virtually tell the slave States, that, so 
long as they remain slave States, they shall, to a certain ex- 



18 

tent, and to a great extent too, be shorn of political power — 
of power in the Federal Councils? Now, does such a dimi- 
nution of their power help slavery ? Certainly not. But 
just the reverse. If, instead of allowing the slave to count 
but three-lifths of a person, the Constitution had allowed the 
person, who cannot read and write, to count but three-fifths 
of a person, would it have been chargeable with favoring, 
and putting a bounty upon, illiterateness? Certainly not. 
But just the reverse. This clause, therefore, on the supposi- 
tion, that it refers to slaves, is to be numbered with the 
anti-slaver}'^ features and anti-slavery advantages of the Con- 
stitution. • 

But it is said, that the Constitution is wrong in allowing 
slaves to count at all in the apportionment. Who are they, 
that say so ? Not they, surely, who are intelligent and true 
friends of human rights. Because a man is wronged shall 
he countless than a man? "A man's a man for a' that.'' 
God counts every man a unit. And let us beware how we 
count a man less than his Maker counts him. 

It is also said,»by way of complaining of the Constitution 
and proving its pro-slavery character, that the slaves should 
be allowed to vote. I admit, that they should be. But their 
not being allowed to is the fault, not of the Constitution, but 
the State Government. The State, and not the Federal Gov- 
ernment, regulates voting. I admit, that the Constitution 
wrongs the slave, if it count him less than a unit. But, it 
does not help slavery thereby. The State Government, on 
the contrary, by not allowing the slave to vote, both WTongs 
the slave, and helps slaver}^ 

What, however, if this provision does refer to slaves ? 
What, however, if the Constitution does, in this provision, 
recognize the existence of slavery ? It does not follow, that 
it approvingly recognizes it. And the bare recognition by 
the Federal Government of the existence of slavery, would 
no more impose on it an obligation to uphold slavery, or an 
obligation to forbear to overthrow it, than would such recog- 
nition of the existence of illiterateness impose the like obli- 
gation with respect to illiterateness. Again, to continue this 
provision in force, it is not necessary to continue the existence 



19 

of slavery. The cessation of slavery would not make any 
amendment of the provision necessary. 

But, after all, can this clause, without doing violence to 
its language and to the canon of interpretation, be made to 
refer to slavery ? Mr. Spooncr has made an extended and 
masterly argument to show that the correlative of " free" in 
this connexion cannot be slaves. 

The word " free" in the political papers of England, and 
in such papers in this country, at that day, denoted those, 
who enjoy citizenship, or some franchise or especial privilege. 
Again, we are to interpret a word, if possible, in the light of 
the paper, and so as to harmonize it with the paper, in 
which it is used. But the Constitution does not refer to 
slaves. At least, it is to be proved, that it does. It does, 
however, refer to aliens, for it empowers Congress to natur- 
alize them. Hence, we are to interpret " free" as the correla- 
tive of aliens. 

Again, the word " free" must be taken as used, in this 
clause, not only in a political, but in a strictly legal sense. 
What, for instance, can be a more purely legal matter than 
taxation ? The right to tax, and to designate the subjects 
of taxation, is a purely legal right, and the word or words, 
used in creating or describing that right, must, therefore, be 
used with strict legal accuracy. Says Gridley, (Paige's Re- 
ports, 9 : 556,) " the Legislature should be deemed to use the 
term in a legal sense, when applying it to create or describe 
a legal right." 

We proceed to the examination of the clause respecting 
the migration and importation of persons. And, now, if this 
clause does refer to slaves, what do we learn from it, but that 
1 he General Government got the States to consent, that, at 
the end of nineteen years, it might stop their prosecution of 
the slave trade? Was this pro-slavery on the part of that 
Government? The very reverse. If I get my drunken 
neighbor to consent, that, after one month, (and one loeek is 
more in the life of a man than nineteen years in the life of 
a nation,) I may break his bottles, and, if need be, compel 
him to be sober, am I, therefore, to be held up as favoring 
intemperance ? 



20 

Again, on the supposition, that this clause does refer to 
slaves, what a striking argument does it afford of the anti- 
slavery sentiment of that day— and, by inference, of the 
anti-slavery character of the Constitution ! Groundless and 
delusive, as was the belief, it was, nevertheless, the universal 
belief, both in England and America, that the discontinuance 
of the African slave trade would be the discontinuance of 
African slavery. Hence, a Constitutional provision for 
breaking up this trade in that generation, was regarded as in 
effect a Constitutional provision for breaking up African sla- 
very in that generation. 

I deny, however, that this clause is to be interpreted, as re- 
ferring to slaves. Surely, the unenslaved as well as the en- 
slaved, can emigrate from one part of our country to another, 
and can be the subjects of importation also. Why, then, 
shall we not prefer the meaning, which is innocent, to that 
which favors crime, and establishes injustice? We must 
prefer it. The legal rules of interpretation require it. 

But, it was, perhaps, unnecessary to examine this clause. 
It can, now, have no power to uphold, or put down, slavery. 
It expired, by its own limitation, more than forty years ago. 

The clause, respecting " domestic violence," is next in or- 
der. If there were not to have been slaves in the country, 
nevertheless would not this clause have been proper? 
Whether this clause shall, at any time, operate against, in- 
stead of /or, the slaves, turns upon what are the views and 
character of the National Executive, at such time. Were the 
slaves violently to assert their right to freedom, and were 
the President a decided abolitionist and a true man, he would 
promptly take the side of the slaves. And he would do so— 
lst,because he would go for the Federal Constitution, and 
would treat the slave laws as void, because repugnant to the 
Constitution— 2d, because he would regard, not the slaves, 
but those, who rose against them, as the insurgents— because 
he would regard not those, who were striving to deliver them- 
selves from the cruellest bonds, but those, who were striving 
to re-fasten these bonds, as the guilty ones— as the ones guilty 
of " domestic violence." 

The last of the clauses, claimed to be pro-slavery, is that, 



21 

which respects fugitives from service. But, had there been 
no slaves in the country, and no prospect of there being any, 
this clause, also, would still have been proper. Under this 
clause, minor children and lawfully indentured apprentices, 
who have fled from those, who are entitled to their services, 
can be reclaimed. Indeed, the clause must be taken as re- 
ferring to such. It cannot refer to slaves. The fugitives in 
the clause are capable of owing. But slaves cannot owe, 
any more than horses can owe. It is true, that the slave is 
really a man. But, under the legal fiction, he is only a thing : 
and a legal fiction in this ease, as well as a legal fiction in 
every other case, is to be interpreted strictly, and not extend- 
ed beyond its proper bounds. There are some, however, who 
claim, that the slave can, in the eye of the Federal Constitu- 
tion, owe service, because in its eye, he is a person, and not 
a thing. I will illustrate the absurdity of the supposition, 
that the slave can, either on the supposition, that he is a per- 
son, or on the supposition, that he is a chattel, owe any thing. 
A person claimed to be a fugitive slave, is brought before a 
magistrate. "On what ground do you claim his services?" 
asks the magistrate. " On the ground," answers the claim- 
ant, "that he is my property." " But," rejoins the magistrate, 
'"the Constitution, even as held by the Supreme Court of the 
United States, admits no right of property in man." " Then," 
says the. claimant, "I claim his services on the ground, that 
he is a person." " But," replies the magistrate, " it takes two 
persons to make a bargain. In the case of a man and a 
mouse, one can make the bargain. The man catches the 
mouse : and the mouse is his, without the consent of the 
mouse. But, far otherwise is it in the case of two persons. 
If one claim the services of the other, he must show the con- 
tract, by which that other consented to serve him." 

Another reason, why the fugitives in this clause are not 
slaves, is, that Ihcy are held to service or labor under the 
laws. The laws, however, do but admit the master's right of 
property in his slave, as they do his like right in his ox. And 
whether it be the ox or the slave, that is lazy or unmanagea- 
ble, the laws will not interfere to coerce service. There 
was not, at the time the Constitution was adopted, a slave- 



22 

law in all Christendom, which claimed service or labor from 
the slave. 

" Under the laws thereof." Observe, that the language is 
not under the enactments of the Legislature thereof : but 
"under the laws thereof." Hence, this clause cannot, possi- 
bly, be brought to the help of the pro-slavery interpretation 
of the Constitution. For the Constitution must first, and ir- 
respectively of this clause, be shown to be pro-slavery, ere 
pro-slavery enactments can be called laws. Under our anti- 
slavery Constitution, pro-slavery enactments, being repug- 
nant to it, are null and void — are no laws. Suppose, that the 
Virginia Legislature should enact, that the scores of families, 
who have recently emigrated from this State to that, shall be 
slaves — and suppose, farther, that these slaves shall succeed 
in escaping to their old State — would we not deny, that the 
enactment is Constitutional, and is, law 1 But, why are we 
not at libert)' to take this course with every pro-slavery en- 
actment ? 

Again — the pro-slavery interpretation of this clause is for- 
bidden by that clause in the Constitution, which provides, 
that "Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exer- 
cise of religion." For does not that pro-slavery interpreta- 
tion interfere with the free exercise of religion ? Most em- 
phatically it does, if the law of 1793 fairly reflects that 
interpretation, and truly answers its demands. For that law 
threatens its heavy penalties upon all, who open their doors 
to the poor flying and affrighted slaves. And can they act 
the christian, and not see Jesus Christ Himself in these his 
humblest representatives ; and not remember, that as they do, 
or do not, unto these "least" ones, they do, or do not, unto 
Him? None will deny, that it is the religion of Jesus Christ, 
which the Constitution refers to ; for that was then, as it is 
now, the professed religion of the land. Moreover, the men- 
tion, which the Constitution makes of Sunday, is such, as to 
show, that Christianity is the religion it refers to. 

The notion, that " the free exercise of religion" consists in 
the liberty to hold what creed we will, and join what church 
we will, and observe what forms of M-^orship we will, is ex- 
ceedingly superficial and false. There is no " free exercise 



23 

of religion," whrre the right to do all the deeds, which rea- 
son and humanity and religion call for, is not fully acknowl- 
edged. 

And, now, must we believe, that our fathers intended to 
make this whole hmd the slaveholder's hunting ground ? — and 
to have the public authorities everywhere, ay, and, also, as 
eminent statesmen have recently contended, private citizens 
every where, join in chasing down the innocent human prey ? 
For one, I will not, cannot, believe it. For one, I will not, 
cannot, believe, that our fathers were the most merciless of 
all men. Even, under the Jewish code, the escaping servant 
was not to be returned to his master — but was to be allowed 
to reside wherever he should choose. Even the Spaniards 
had mercy enough to admit into their treaty with the Moors 
an article, " by which runaway Moorish slaves from other 
parts of the kingdom were made free and incapable of being 
reclaimed by their masters, if they could reach Granada." 
But, under the pro-slavery interpretation of the Federal Con- 
stitution, there is not even a Granada left to the poor Ameri- 
can slave. Under that interpretation, it is held, that, go 
w^hithersoever he will, in our own nation, or in any foreign na- 
tion, the two legged hounds and the four legged hounds are at 
liberty to bay upon his track. In 1826 our Government waS 
guilty of the Heaven-defying crime of negotiating for the 
surrender of slaves, who had fled to Canada and Mexico. 

And, now, why is it, that we must put this construction on 
the clause in question ? Is it because its words require it ? 
Its words forbid it. It is, as we are told, because the framers 
of this clause intended to couch in it this horrid and infernal 
meaning. But what have we, when construing this clause. 
to do with the intentions of its framers ? Nothing. Had 
they, however, the wicked intentions here ascribed to them ' 
The proof is to the contrary. 

The clause under consideration is called one of the com- 
promises of the Constitution. But not one word was said on 
the subject of it in the Convention, which framed the Consti- 
tution, until twenty days before they finished their labors ; 
and then, so far from there being any struggle about it, the 
clause was adopted in nearly its present form, without one 



24 

word of debate, or one dissenting voice. The clause was a 
compromise,' however, and we will see how it was such. It 
was introduced, August 28th, with the word " slave" in it. 
In that shape, however, it met with so little favor, that it was 
promptly withdrawn. It was introduced, the following day, 
with the word " slave" struck out ; and then, every member 
of the Convention unhesitatingly acquiesced in it. This, and 
this onl}^ is the compromise, which attaches to the clause in 
question. With what pro-slavery eyes must he look into this 
piece of historj^ who finds in it evidence of the pro-slavery 
character of the Constitution ! 

But, I have not yet done with this clause. A fortnight 
after it was adopted, and when the "Committee of style and 
arrangement" reported the Constitution, the word " servi- 
tude" Avas struck out of the Constitution, and " service" 
unanimously inserted in its place, for the avowed reason, that 
"•the former expresses the condition of slaves, and the latter, 
the obligations of free persons." What a pack of hypocrites 
the members of the Convention must have been, if they still 
meant, that the word " service," in the clause under consid- 
eration, should be construed " to express the condition of 
slaves !" 

I have now disposed of the four provisions of the Constitu- 
tion, which are claimed to be pro-slavery. Is it said, that, 
notwithstanding they are not pro-slavery, the provision for 
the apportionment of representatives operates in favor of 
slavery, and that the provisions, respecting " domestic vio- 
lence" and fugitives from service, are liable to be perverted 
to the advantage of slavery? — my answer, in that case, is — 
" then abolish slavery — and abolish it immediately." I would 
add, that, even if these provisions do refer to slavery, there is 
no objection in that fact to its abolition by Federal authority. 
The provision, that a slave shall count but three-fifths of a 
man, would not be a provision to continue him in slavery. 
It would be a provision applying to him, whilst a slave, be 
the period shorter or longer. And what if the provision re- 
specting fugitives from service does refer to slaves? It im- 
poses no duty upon the Federal Government — for it is not to 
be executed by that Government. The decision of the Su- 



25 

preme Court of the United States, in the Prigg case, is an 
utterly gratuitous subservience to the slave power, and is 
entitled to no respect. This provision includes no grant of 
power to the Federal Government. It is to be executed by 
the States, under State authority, and by State officers ; and 
if a State fail to execute it, the Federal Government is neither 
to supply the Uwsfe, nor punish the delinquent. But, suppose ^^-^ \ 
this provision to be pro-slavery, and the Federal Government 
to be under obligation to execute it — therein would be a rea- 
son, not for its forbearing, but for its hastening, to overthrow 
slavery, that so it might no longer be called on to do the cruel 
and wicked work of re-plunging men into slavery. For one, 
I am heartily glad, that the South elects to release the 
States from this work, and to claim it at the hands of the 
Federal Government. This claim is a trumpet-tongued call 
upon that Government to use, without delay, the powers, ^ J ^ 
which it yii'gtfiBMieHi for overthrowing the whole system of /^'^^/^y' 
American slavery. 

I will, now, proceed to enumerate some, and only some of 
the provisions of the Constitution, which are incompatible 
with slavery, and which, therefore, demand its abolition. It 
will be seen, that, in a part of these provisions, there is power 
to abolish slavery. 

1st. " Congress has power to provide for the common defence and general 
welfare of the United States." 

But, to how very limited an extent, can this power be ex- 
ercised amidst the influences and obstacles of slavery ! It is 
not proper to say, that Congress has this power, if the exer- 
cise of it may be obstructed by State authority — if the power 
itself may be rendered entirelj', or even partially, nugatory 
by that authority. It is absurd to sa}', that certain laws give 
a man power to drive his carriage through the streets, if, at 
the same time, other laws may be effectually pleaded for 
blocking its wheels. If the States may set up, and give any 
extent to, slavery, and sink themselves into the worst piracies, 
and so create, within their respective limits an atmosphere, 
in which the Federal Government cannot "live and move 
and have its bring ;" then the States have, virtually, the 
power of reducing the Federal Government, beyond the 



26 

sphere of its exclusive jurisdiction, to no Government, 
at all. 

This power to provide, &c.. Congress can never have faith- 
fully exercised, so long ns it leaves millions of foes in the 
bosom of the United States. Congress can enrol the slaves 
in the militia, and yield to their Constitutional right — "to 
keep and bear arms." This would, at oncefiibolish slavery, 
and convert these millions of foes into friends. 

This power of Congress to provide, &c., Patrick Henry, at 
that time the orator of America, held to be ample to effectu- 
ate the abolition of Am.erican slavery. In the Virginia Con- 
vention, which passed upon the Federal Constitution, Mr. 
Henry said : 

" May Congress not say, that every black man must fight ? Did we not see 
a little of this, the last war? We were not so hard pushed, as to make 
emancipation general. But acts of Assembly passed, that every slave, who 
would go to the army, should be free. Another thing will contribute to 
bring this event about. Slavery is detested. We f(i^4j;^]t*ial,eflects. We 
deplore it with all the pity of humanity. Let all these considerations, at 
some future period, press with full force on the minds of Congress. They 
will read that paper (tlie Constitution) and see if they have power of manu- 
mission. And have they not, Sir? Have they not power to provide for 
the general defence and welfare ? May they not think, that they call for the 
abolition of slavery ? May they not pronounce all slaves free ? — and will 
they not be warranted by that power ? There is no ambiguous implication 
or logical deduction. The Paper speaks to the point. They have the 

FOWEPo IN CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL TERMS: AND WILL CLEARLY AND CER- 
TAINLY EXERCISE IT." 

2d. " Congress has power to impose a capitation tax." 
To whom must the Government look, in suchcase, for pay- 
ment? To none other, certainly, than the subject of the poll 
tax. The Government is under no obligation to pay atten- 
tion to the superlatively nonsensical and wicked claim of 
the ownership of men. If it is, then States would have the 
power to defeat the collection of a tax imposed upon its sub- 
jects — for it might assert, that some half dozen paupers with- 
in its bounds shall be called the owners of all its other sub 
jects. We see, then, how utterly incompatible is slaver}^ with 
this cause. It is so, 1st, because the slave is not liable to pay 
any thing — and 2nd, because slavery could defeat the collec- 
tion of the tax. 

3d. " Congress shall have power to establish a uniform rule of naturali- 
zation." 

But this power is inconsistent with the right to continue 



27 

slavery. Under this power, Congress can, any hour, natur- 
alize, and confer citizenship upon foreigners, or slaves, or 
whom it will. In other words, if the three millions of Ameri- 
can slaves are not alread}'' citizens, and, therefore, already 
entitled to all the rights of citizens. Congress can, under this 
power, give citizenship and liberty to them, any hour. If, at 
the time the Constitution was made, the slaveholders had de- 
sired (as, however, they did not) to perpetuate slavery, they 
would, if they could, have qualified this absolute and unlim- 
ited power of naturalizatiouo 

4th. " The Congress sliall have power to promote the progress of science 
and useful arts by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the ex- 
clusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." 

Have not Congress the right, in this clause, to encourage 

and reward genius, as well in the case of him, who is called 

a slave, as in the case of any other person 1 Certainly. 

Every person is entitled to a copy right of his book, and to a 

patent for his meritorious invention. But how incompatible 

is this with slavery, the victim of which has no rights, and 

the productions of whose mind, equally with the productions 

of his hands, belong to his master ! 

5th. "Congress shall have power to declare war, grant letters of marque 
and reprisal — to raise and support armies — to provide and maintain a navy." 

Must Congress get the consent of a State, as to whom it 
may enlist in its armies or navies, and as to whom it may 
grant letters of marque and reprisal ? Then, it follows, that 
Congress has no absolute power for carrying on war. Mani- 
festly, Congress can contract with whom it pleases — white or 
blaci;, bond or free — to fight its battles ; and can secure to 
each his wages, his pension, his prize-money. But how in- 
consistent is all this with the claim of the slaveholder to the 
earnings, the will, the all, of the soldier, or sailor, whom he 
might claim to be his slave 1 

6th. " The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a re- 
publican form of government." 

We often hear it said, that the General Government should 

not concern itself with the internal poHcyaud arrangements 

of the States. But to neglect to do so might involve its own 

ruin, and also the cruellest wrong and deepest distress to the 

masses in one or more of the States. Suppose, that, in one 



28 

State, suffrage were universal ; in another conditioned on the 
ownership of ten thousand dollars in land or money ; in 
another on the ownership of a dozen slaves ; and in another 
on literar}'^ and scientific attainments ; and in the others on 
still rarer attainments and possessions, and all differing from 
each other. What a lack of similarity and sympathy there 
would be, in that case, between the Congressional represen- 
tations of the different States ! What discord in our National 
Councils ! What rein to our National interests ! In the next 
place, how cruel and guilty would be the infidelity of the 
General Government to its obligations, were it to leave the 
masses in a State, who are oppressed by aristocratic and des- 
potic forms of Government, to cry out, in vain, for a republi- 
can form of Government ? 

Bat is it not true, that our Nation is already brought into 
great peril by the slaveocratic element in our Federal Coun- 
cils ? — and is it not also true, that, in some of the States, the 
white, as well as the black masses, are already crushed by 
the slaveocratic form of government 1 These masses have a 
fair, Constitutional, and most urgent claim on the nation for 
republican State Governments. 

7th. " No State shall pass any bill of attainder." 

But what is so causeless and cruel a bill of attainder, as the 
attainting of a woman and all her posterity, to the end of 
time, for no other offence than having African blood in her 
veins — be it even but one drop, and that accompanied by a 
purely white skin? 

8th. " The privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, 
unless, when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may re- 
quire it." 

This writ Blackstone well calls "'the most celebrated writ 
of England, and the chief bulwark of the Constitution." 
One of his editors, Mr. Christian, says that "it is this writ, 
which makes slavery impossible in England." This writ is 
wholly incompatible with the right of property in man. Such 
right must render the writ completely impotent. If property 
can be plead in the prisoner, (and possession is proof of own- 
ership) the writ is defeated. 

Slavery can be legalized, only by suspending, the writ of 



29 

Habeas Corpus, in the case of the slaves. But the Constitu- 
tion provides for no such suspension: and, hence, there is no 
legal slavery in the land. A suspension of the privilege of 
the writ of Habeas Corpus, in the case of certain persons, 
would be a substantially proper definition of the law of sla- 
very. 

I would add under this head, that Federal Judges should 
be multiplied, until, if need be, there shall be one in every 
slaveholding county, or even in every town — Judges, who 
would honestly and effectually use the writ of Habeas Cor- 
pus in behalf of the deliverance of every slave. 

9th. " Slavery is incompatible with the provision of the Constitution in 
favor of the free exercise of religion." 

The free exercise of religion involves the right to impart 
and receive religious and all useful knowledge. But, to for- 
bid (under the severest penalties upon both teacher and 
learner) either the free or the enslaved colored person to read 
the Bible, or even spell the name of Jesus Christ, is admitted 
to be essential to the maintenance of slaver}'. 

lOth. " No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law." 

It is often said, that nothing can be gained for the slave 
from this provision, for the reason, that the slave is held by 
law, and, therefore, by due process of law. But, this is a pro- 
vision against wrong : — and what an absurdity would it be 
for the organic and fundamental law of the land to forbid a 
wrong, on the condition, that some statutory, or other subor- 
dinate law, do not authorize it ! 

The phrase " due process of law," has no such absurd 
meaning, as that, just referred to. Lord Coke explains "due 
process of law" to be, " by indictment or presentment of 
good and lawful men, where such deeds be done in due man- 
ner, or by suit original of the common law." 

Bronson says, (Hill's Reports, 8th vol., p. 1 iC) of this part 
of the Constitution : 

" The meaning of the section then seems to be, that no member of the 
State shall be disfranchised, or deprived of any of his riglits or privileges, un- 
less the matter shall be adjudged against him upon trial had, according to 
the course of the common law." 

He adds : 
"The words 'due process of law' in this place cannot mean less than a 



30 

prosecution or suit, instituted and conducted, according to tlie prescribed 
forms and solemnities for ascertaining guilt, or determining the title to 
property." 

11th. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa- 
pers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated." 

These two provisions, which I have last quoted, and which 
are, on their face, so utterly incompatible with slavery, are 
said to be negations of Federal power onl)^— not of the 
power of the States.* My first answer is, that no such dis- 
tinction appears in the language of the provisions. The lan- 
guage makes the provisions apply, as well to the control of 
the action of State Governments, as of the Federal Govern- 
ment. My second answer is, that there is abundant histori- 
cal evidence, that the language was designed, as well to re- 
strict State Governments, as the Federal Government.! 

I have, now, gone through with my examination of the 
Constitution. It is not a pro-slavery instrument — is it ? It is 
an anti-slavery instrument — is it not 1 It demands the aboli- 
tion of every part and parcel of American slavery — does it 
not ? Why was not this demand obeyed, immediately after 
the adoption of the Constitution ? I admit, that there was, 
at that time, no desire, no purpose, to array the powers of 
that instrument against slavery. The reason of this was, 
that slavery was regarded, on all hands, as a doomed and 
rapidly expiring evil, and that it was thought better to let it 
live out on sufterance its brief existence — an existence, which 
could not extend beyond that generation — than to disturb the 
infant and unconsolidated Nation by putting an immediate 
stop to it. Many facts might be cited to show, that the end 
of slavery was then thought to be drawing near. Among 
these, is the fact, that the price of a slave, at that period, was 
not a fourth, or a third, as great as now. Another is, that 
such men, as Washington and Jefferson, were laboring for 
the abolition of slavery. Another is, that, whilst the Con- 
vention, sitting in Philadelphia, were framing our anti-sla- 
very Constitution, the Congress, sitting in New York, were 

• Whilst it is to be regretted, that Senator Chase, in his very able speech on Mr. Clay's Reso- 
lutions, takes the ground, that these provisions are negations (n Federal power only, it is, 
neveilliL'less, very gratifying to find his virtual admission, tliiUif they are negations on the pow- 
ers of the States also, they are fatal, as well to State, as to Federal slavery. 

■(■ See Appendix. 



31 



with but one dissenting voice, (and that of a Northern mem- 
ber,) passing the celebrated Ordinance, which excludes sla- 
very forever from that vast Territory, comprising the States 
of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin. 

Let it be borne in mind here, as another evidence of the 
anti-slavery character of the Constitution, that a part of the 
persons, who framed it, were also members of the anti-sla- 
very Congress then in session. Would they be like to go 
against slavery in the one Body, and for it in the other ? 

I have given the reason, why the Constitution was not used, 
as soon as it was adopted, to put slavery to death. This 
reason is, in brief, that it was deemed needless to kill what 
was dying so certainly and so rapidly. But, what is the rea- 
son, why it was not put to death, some ten or twenty years 
afterwards, when it was found to have revived, and' to be 
strengthening and extending itself? Alas, slavery was be- 
coming immensely lucrative !— and the avarice of the Na- 
tion—that passion so mighty to paralyze the moral sense and 
engulf the virtuous affections — was, now, interested in sla- 
ver}-, and enlisted for its protection. 

Eli Whitney's cotton gin is the secret of the revival and 
power of American slavery. It was invented in 1793. The 
total amount of cotton exported from this country, previous 
to that year, was but 742,860 pounds. The export of 1795 
was six and a quarter millions— of 1800 seventeen millions 
and four-fifths— of 1835 three hundred and eighty-six millions. 
The growth of slavery, has kept pace with the growth of 
cotton. The half million of slaves, with which we began 
our national existence, are multiplied into three millions. 

Since the invention of the gin, numerous causes for uphold- 
ing and extending slavery, have come into being. One has 
begotten another. Tliey have multiplied themselves indefi- 
nitely. The necessity of holding this or that National po- 
litical party together, has been one cause for continuing and 
favoring slavery: the necessity of holding this or that Na- 
tional religious party together has been another. Every 
blow at slavery is a blow at the harmony and at the very ex- 
istence of these parties. How corrupt, then, must be Ameri- 



32 

can politics — how corrupt, then, must be American religion — 
all can judge. 

One of the most efficient causes, at the present day, for the 
reconcilement of the public mind to slavery, is the belief, 
that some of the framers and adopters of the Constitution 
did really mean to get slavery into it. But, what if they did ? 
The only pertinent question, at this point, is : " Did they get 
it in ?" If, in drawing up a paper to express my bargain 
with my neighbor, I try to embody a fraudulent claim ; but 
couch it in terms so obscure and enigmatical, that the Court, 
before whom I seek to enforce it, cannot see it ; must the 
Court, nevertheless, allow my claim ? Must the Court take 
the will for the deed ? — ay, my bare assertion of my will, in 
lieu of the lacking proof of the deed ? Must the Court re- 
ward my endeavor to cheat my neighbor, albeit the endeavor 
was an abortive one ? and albeit, too, that the only proof of 
its having been made rested upon my own shameless testi- 
mony ? 

Another, and still more efficient reason for the public ac- 
quiescence in slavery, is that its victims belong to a weak, 
and helpless, and despised race — that they may, therefore, 
be outraged with impunity — and that the legality of their 
enslavement need not, therefore, be strictly inquired into. 

Alas, alas, my colored countrymen, was there ever so ill- 
starred and wronged a people as you are? Whilst, in the 
case of other persons, it is held, that nothing short of a posi- 
tive, defmite, clear, certain law will suffice to fasten upon 
its victims the chains of slavery ; in your case it is held, that 
the loosest inferences and vaguest implications are sufficient 
to secure this horrid result. No respectable lawyer would 
say, that, by the force of such inferences and implications, a 
man should be deprived of his horse, or even of his dog. 
Nevertheless, almost all lawyers and almost all other men, 
not excepting the most prominent abolitionists, maintain, that, 
by the force of such inferences and implications, men may 
be deprived of more than their life — even of their liberty — 
for liberty is more precious than life. The grave of liberty 
is more to be dreaded than the grave of the body. I said, my 
colored brethren, that even the most prominent abolitionists 



33 

are against you at this vital point. That they are is among 
your heaviest calamities. 

How would Mr. Clay, or Mr. Webster, or Mr. Calhoun, 
meet the proposition, that the men of this country, who be- 
long to the proud and strong Anglo-Saxon race, can, by the 
force of such inferences and implications, as we have alluded 
to — can, by the force of a Constitution, which, at the most, 
does not make one express allusion to slavery — be held in 
slavery 1 They would scout it, with the utmost contempt. 
Why, then, do these gentlemen hold, that such inferences and 
implications are sufficient to bind in slavery the three millions 
of our colored countrymen ? Ah, it is because these three 
millions are weak and powerless ; and that we may, there- 
fore, wrong them, as we will. 

I insist, that the Constitution does not allow the three 
millions of our colored countrymen to be held in slavery, and 
I insist on this, because I insist, that the law to hold Africans 
in slavery shall be as positive and definite and stringent, as 
the law to hold Anglo-Saxons in slavery. 

How long, oh how long, shall the North, and even the abo- 
litionists of the North, continue to sustain the claim of the 
South to the Constitutionality of slavery ? Just so long as 
they do, the slaveholder will be strong, and his victims will 
be powerless in his grasp. Just so long as they do, the poor 
black men of the South, ay, and also the poor white men of 
the South, will crouch down and tremble around him. But 
strip him of the power and influence, which he derives from 
the sheer falsehood, that the Constitution is pro-slavery^ and 
the charm is gone — and he has become as weak as other 
men — and the public sentiment, which had hitherto braced 
him up, now falls away from him — and, now, he is derided 
for his impotence — and, now, he is hated with impunity — and, 
now, his slaves rise up around him, and successfully assert 
their claim to freedom. 

But, I must hasten to the end of my remarks. 

Gentlemen of the Legislature ! you have honored me 

greatly, in permitting me, a private, uninfluential individual, 

to appear before you — in permitting me, who am ignorant of 

all law, to address to you an argument on the gravest 



34 

question of Constitutional law. May I, now, ask, that you 
will honor yourselves ?-— and honor yourselves, too, infinitely, 
more than you have honored me ? Do yourselves the im- 
measurable, the immortal honor to grant the prayers of the 
petitioners, whom I represent on this occasion. Tell the 
slaveholders, that their demand for extended slavery has put 
you upon the examination of their title to existing slavery : 
and that, so far from finding they have title to more, you find 
them without title to what they have. 

Grant these prayers, gentlemen, and you will be among 
the bravest and best benefactors of mankind. Do this, gen- 
tlemen, and you will have done an amount of good, that few 
men have it in their power to do. Strike this heavy blow 
for freedom — and, in less than five years, it will be repeated 
by the Legislature of every Free vState in the Union. Strike 
this heavy blow for freedom — and, ere ten years pass away, 
the doors of the great Southern prison-house will fly open, 
and the millions of imprisoned ones will taste the sweets of 
liberty. 

Gentlemen, will you do it ? You will not, if you stoop to 
inquire how such a proceeding of justice and mercy will be 
viewed by Southern politicians ; or how it will affect this or 
that political party. You will not do it, if you pause to 
parley with the tempters, which, in such a case, are wont to 
cluster around even the good man's soul, and ply its integrity 
with their seductions. But, you will do it, gentlemen, if you 
" remember them, that are in bonds as bound with them" — if 
you put your souls in their souls stead, and feel, as if the 
chains upon their limbs are also upon your own, and as if the 
iron, which has entered their souls, has also entered yours. 
In a word, you will do it, if you resign yourselves to the coun- 
sels of reason and humanity and religion. You will do it, if 
you forget not, that every man is to render, at the last day, 
an account of all the deeds done in the body. 



APPENDIX. 



It ia argued, that tliese Constitutional specific denials of the deprivation 
and violation of rights are limitations upon the power of the Federal Gov- 
ernment only. It is so, argued, on the ground, that, when the Constitution 
does not point out, whether the limitations are on Federal or State power, it 
is to be inferred, that they are on Federal power, and on that only. 

Whence, however, the justification of such inference ? From the fact, it ia 
answered, that the Federal power is the subject matter of the Constitution — 
is that of which it treats — is that, which it constitutes. But, this is not a 
just view of the case. The paper, called the Federal Constitution, is as dis- 
tinctly a paper for fixing lunits, within which the States shall keep themselves, 
as it is for constituting the Federal Government : — and the one purpose is no 
less important, or necessary, than the other. WJiat, however, if the infer- 
ence referred to were warrantable ? So far, certainly, as the original Con- 
stitution is concerned, it matters not — for nothing of the uncertainty in 
question is to be found in it. The original Constitution shows too plainly to 
make a more frequent recurrence of the word " Congress" necessary, that 
the 8th and 9th sections of its 1st article were devoted to the enumeration of 
the powers and disabilities of Congi-ess. It also shows plainly, that the 
10th section of the same article was devoted to the enumeration of the dis- 
abilities of the States. All this is too plain ever to have been doubted. We 
have lying before us an old copy of the Constitution, printed in Virginia, in 
which "Powers of Congress" is at the head of the 8th section, and "Re- 
strictions upon Congress" is at the head of the 9th section, and " Restric- 
tions upon Respective States" is at the head of the 10th section. 

Why, however, it is asked, was it necessary to have a repetition of the 
word "State" in the 10th section, any more than a repetition of the word 
" Congress" in the 9th section ? The ready answer is, that it would not have 
been necessary, had the negation of State powers been preceded by the enu- 
meration of State powers, as is tlie negation of Federal powers by the enu- 
meration of Federal powers. 

So far as respects the sections we have referred to, the Constitution is, 
surely, not to be charged with making room for the looseness of inference. 
It had just devoted a section to limikiiions on the Federal power. It pro- 
ceeds to devote tlie next section to limitations, and some of them identical 
with limitations in the other section. What, but upon State powers, could 
these limitations be upon? And yet, to avoid the necessity of inference, tlie 
word " State" is repeated several times, in connection with these limitations. 
We add, where, in the original Constitution, either before or after the three 
sections spoken of, is it left to inference, whether the powers granted, or de- 
nied, be Federal or State powers'? No where. 

The prohibition in tlie 9th section: " No ex post facto l.-iw, or bill of at- 
tainder shall be passed," is that, which is relied on to prove, that any proiiibi- 



36 

tion in the Constitution, wlilch like this, does not, in terms, apply to any 
Government, is to be construed as applying to the Federal Government, and 
that only. But we have shown, that the place and connection in the Consti- 
tution of this recited prohibition superseded the necessity of applying it, in 
terms, to the Federal Government. Were there a reasonable doubt, (which 
there is not,) that the place and connection of this prohibition determine the 
application, we should be at liberty to look away from the Constitution to 
collateral testimonies. And how quick would the doubt be dispelled ! For, 
not only did the draft of the Constitution, which was under discussion, when 
near the close of the Convention, this prohibition was inserted — not only we 
say, did this draft include in one chapter, both the powers and disabilities of 
Congress — and not only did the chapter, by beginning with the words: 
" The Legislature of the United States," determine, that every part of it is 
applicable to that Legislature, and that only — but the prohibition was 
moved and inserted in the following words: "The Legislature (Congress) 
shall pass no bill of attainder, nor any ex post facto law." "Tiie Commit- 
tee of style and arrangement" made their Report a few days afterwards, in 
which they slightly varied the phraseology of this and other parts of the 
Constitution. 

We now pass on to the amendments of the Constitution : for it is in them, 
that we find those specific denials of the deprivation and violation of rights, 
which forbid slavery. 

Twelve articles of amendment were proposed by the first Congress. 
The first three, and the last two, do, in terms, refer to the Federal Govern- 
ment, and that only. To what Government or Governments, the other 
seven refer, is a matter of inference. Whilst, however, it would be a to- 
tal violation of the laws of inference to say, that they refer to the Federal 
Government only, it would be in full accordance with these laws to say, 
that, because the other five expressly refer to the Federal Governments, these 
seven refer to the State Governments, or to both the Federal and State Gov- 
ernments. 

Man}-, there doubtless are, who, because the first one of the adopted 
amendments expresses its reference to the Federal Government, infer, that 
there is the like reference, in the case of all the other amendments. But it 
must be borne in mind, that the first two of tlie proposed amendments were 
rejected — that for this reason, the third came to be numbered the first — and 
that all three of them refer expressly to the Federal Government. To say 
that the 11th and 12th of the adopted amendments were proposed by Con- 
gress, after the other ten were adopted, may be to some persons a necessary 
explanation. 

We have given one reason, why a part of the amendments of the Consti- 
tution refer to the State Governments exclusivel)-, or to both the Federal 
and State Governments. Another reason is, that they are, in their nature 
and meaning, as applicable to a State Government, as to the Federal Govern- 
ment. And another is, that, if there be only a reasonable doubt, whether 
they refer to the Federal Government exclusively, they should be construed, as 
referring to the State Governments also : for human liberty is entitled to the 
benefit of every reasonable doubt ; and this is a case, in which human liberty 
is most vitally and extensively concerned. 

We are not at libertv to go back, nor aside, of the Constitution to inquire, 
whether the amendments in question, are, or are not, limitations on State 
power. There they are, as suitably, in their terms, nature, and meaning, limi- 
tations on State, as on Federal power. This being the fact, we are to be- 
lieve, that the people, when adopting them by their Legislatures, interpreted 
them as having the two-fold application, which we claim for them. This be- 
ing the fact, the people now, whether their fathers did, or did not, may insist, 
and must insist, on this two-fold apjtlication. In the name, then, of reason 



37 

and religion, of humanity and God, we protest against the supplanting of 
our just interpretation with one, which shall minister to the diabolical pur- 
pose of holding millions of our countrymen and their posterity in the crud- 
est and foulest bondage. 

Were, however, the Constitution obscure on the point under considera- 
tion, we should, nevertheless, not be without collateral testimony, in be- 
half of our interpretation. It is an interesting and apposite historical fact, 
that almost all the amendments of the Constitution, and all of them, in 
which, on the present occasion, we are concerned, were taken from the 
Bill of Rights, which the Virginia Convention proposed to have incorpo- 
rated with the Federal Constitution. But this Bill of Rights speaks neither 
of Congress nor of the Federal Government: and it evidently contemplates 
absolute security : — security, as well from the invasion of State, as of Fed- 
eral power. 

Were we, in quest of further collateral testimony, to go to the proceed- 
ings of the Congress, which submitted the amendments, we should find, that 
Mr. Madison was the first person to move in the matter ; that he proposed 
two series of amendments, one of them atfecting Federal, and the other 
State powers ; and that it Avas a part of his proposition to have them inter- 
woven in the original Constitution — for instance, the negations of Federal 
power to be included in the 9th section of the 1st article, and the negations 
of State power to be included in the 10th section of that article. We should 
al«o find, that several of the amendments, which he proposed to have inclu- 
ded in the 10th section are, in substance, and well nigh to the very letter, 
identical with amendments, which are now a part of the Constitution. We 
should also find Mr. Madison justifying himself in the following words for 
his proposition to impose limitations on St;ite power — " I think there is more 
danger of these powers being abused by the State Govermnents, than by 
the Government of the United States" — " It must be admitted on all hands, 
that the State Governments are as liable to attack these invaluable privileges, 
as the General Government is, and therefore ought to be as cautiously guard- 
ed against" — "I should, therefore, wish to extend this interdiction, and add, 
that no State shall violate, &c." — " If there was any reason to restrain the 
Government of the United States from infringing upon these essential 
rights, it was equally necessary, that they should be secured against the State 
Governments. He thought, that if they provided against the one, it was as 
necessary to provide against the other, and was satisfied, that it would be 
equally grateful to the people." 

By looking into the Congressional proceedings referred to, we should also 
find, that the House of Representatives, instead of following 31 r. IMadison'a 
plan of distributing the amendments through tlie original Constitution, and 
so applying one to the Federal and another to the State Governments, made 
them a supplement to the original Constitution, and left a part of tiiem, 
couched in such terms, as render them equally applicable to the Federal and 
State Governments. It should, also, be borne in mind, that this plan of i\Ir. 
JNIadison, whicii was embodied in the Report of a Committee, was kept, a 
long time, before the attention of the House. We should, moreover, find, 
that, whatever may have been said by this or that speaker, respecting the 
application of this or that amendment, no vote was taken, declaring that all, 
or any, of the amendments apply to the Federal Governnifnt. And whilst, 
on the other hand, there was no vote taken, declaring the application of any 
of the amendments to the State Government, there wan a vote taken, which 
serves to show, that the House did not mean to have all the amendments 
apply to the Federal Government exclusively. The vote was on the 
following proposed amendment: "No person shall be subject, in case of 
impeachment, to more than one trial, or one punishment for the same of- 
fence, nor shall be compelled to be a witness against himself, nor be de- 



38 

prived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, &e." Mr. 
Partridge, of Massachusetts, moved to insert after " same offence" the words • 
" by any law of the United States." His motion was lost. The House 
would restrain a State, as well as the Nation, from enacting such an un- 
righteous and oppressive law. 

What, if any, were the proceedings of the Senate, respecting the amend- 
ments of the Constitution, except to concur with the House in recommend- 
ing them, we do not know— for its five first sessions were with closed 
doors. 



54 



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